Operation Sindoor marked India’s assertive retaliation to terrorism, demonstrating military dominance, technological superiority, strategic clarity, and global diplomatic confidence.
The negative narrative surrounding these events must change
Lt. Gen. K S Brar
PVSM, AVSM, GOC, Dakshin Bharat Area
I want to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the entire nation for standing behind the Indian Army during Operation Sindoor. The nation has now become acutely aware of the importance of the armed forces. People now realise that with changing geopolitical dynamics, the entire country is at risk if the armed forces do not perform. Without strong armed forces, nations simply do not survive.
The nation was shocked by the heinous terrorist attack at Pahalgam, marking a clear escalation initiated by Pakistan. There is more than enough evidence linking them to this act—it was a calculated move with three objectives. First, certain elements were unhappy with the return of peace, harmony, and tourism in Kashmir. They could not tolerate the region’s path toward normalcy, and it is the people of Kashmir who have suffered the most after the attack.
Second, the goal was to create a divide within India. However, India is a mature democracy, and its people are wise enough not to fall prey to such tactics. Third, it was a strategic ploy by the Pakistani Army to regain focus and redirect public attention, as they were grappling with significant internal turmoil. Historically, whenever they rally around anti-India or anti-Kashmir sentiments, their internal divisions seem to vanish, and the nation temporarily unites.
Unfortunately for them, their Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, miscalculated our response. We struck back, hitting nine terrorist camps, including one in the heart of Punjab. We had no intention of escalating, but the Pakistan Army thrives on the narrative that they are superior and can mislead their population. This time, however, the damage was too visible. They couldn’t hide it—they were forced to retaliate.
When they did, we outmanoeuvred them—not just once, but on the second, third, and fourth nights. They crumbled. Their air bases were neutralised. The scale of damage was equivalent to targeting cities like Bombay, Chennai, and Bangalore. They were decisively overwhelmed. The only damage they could inflict was in a border village, where a woman lost her life. The rest occurred at the Line of Control (LOC), where cross-border firing is a regular occurrence. Since they couldn’t effectively target the army, they resorted to attacking civilians.
On the Pakistani side, official records indicate that over 100 terrorists were killed. We saw the funerals of some of their prominent figures on television, with the army standing next to them, as though officers had been shot down. Immense damage was inflicted upon them, but they cover everything up with their narrative.
For Pakistan, India is the enemy they cannot fight conventionally. As a result, they recruit individuals from impoverished backgrounds, radicalise them by projecting a larger cause, send them across the border, and even drug them. The army takes care of their families. This cycle continues: one hundred fall, and another hundred replace them. The Pakistan Army consists of 70% Pakistani Punjabis, who essentially rule the country, while the rest of the nation remains in dire straits.
Stop the Negative Narrative
Some have questioned why this four-day war ended so quickly. I consider it a remarkable achievement. Let me provide an example: when the Ukraine war began, Russia was initially on the back foot. In a high-level panel discussion, I remarked that it was the right moment for Ukraine to negotiate an exit from the war. However, they believed they were winning and pursued the notion of decisively defeating Russia. It was a miscalculation. Look at the situation now.
The West has not decisively won a war since World War II. Even a small country like Afghanistan could not be subdued. They had to withdraw from Vietnam. China has not fought a war in decades. But we have fought every war and won. We have engaged in insurgency conflicts and battles in Jammu and Kashmir. The closure of Operation Sindoor was executed with precision. If we still question it, then we are challenging our strategic wisdom. The negative narrative surrounding these events must change.
There are several critical lessons to take from this war. Our equipment and missiles have made us proud, while Chinese equipment failed. Chennai, home to our tank production facility in Avadi, stands as a testament to our defence capabilities.
Be Sensitive with the Army
I was deployed on two or three UN missions. Once, in South Sudan, there was a rebel attack, and Indian soldiers stepped in to save civilians while Chinese soldiers in the same contingent fled. The incident made headlines in the newspapers then. Meanwhile, our media is showcasing Pakistan’s General Asim Munir standing on a tank and delivering speeches. Why portray him in a positive light when the reality is the opposite—we have crushed them. Have you ever seen Western media project Indian generals in a positive light?
If a future war breaks out, even Chennai will not be safe. The Chinese will likely target soft installations across the Bay of Bengal, where we have critical strategic sites. A soldier needs motivation—not tokenism. I urge corporations to hire retired army personnel. They will deliver the best results—as corporate leaders, motivational speakers, technology experts, and logistics administrators. Please show sensitivity when discussing the Indian Army. Do not compare the army to the corporate world. We are among the finest armed forces globally. Show respect, and that will further motivate all of us in uniform.
War is an Extension of Politics
Air Marshal M Matheswaran (Retd)
AVSM, VM, Ph.D (Retd), Chairman & President, The Peninsula Foundation
Clausewitz famously said, ‘War is the extension of politics by other means.’ I don’t call this conflict a ‘war’ because India perfectly demonstrated two or three crucial issues. First, India unequivocally demonstrated to the world and to Pakistan that terrorism absolutely cannot be tolerated, and therefore we will use force to neutralise any support system for terrorists. Second, we demonstrated our willingness to cross the border, as we did during the Balakot strike. We sent a message: “We will strike deep inside your territory, wherever you are. If that escalates, then we will demonstrate our ability to control the escalation.”
The most impressive demonstration in this entire conflict was India’s complete control of the escalation matrix, and the whole world has understood that. We need to understand and appreciate that as well, irrespective of the narratives we might hear. Our tenth strike brought them to their knees, forcing them to ask for a ceasefire. This is the first and only instance of a conflict situation between two nuclear-weapon states where one nuclear-weapon state effectively disarmed the other. That’s how we need to perceive this. We live in a world dominated by Western powers for the last 500 years. The West still calls the shots; they write the rules and construct the narratives.
An Excellent Demonstration of Duties
In this conflict, there was a clear demonstration of the separation of individual duties. The political leadership performed their role effectively, and the Ministry of External Affairs was in complete control. The military was given a complete free hand to execute what needed to be done, as outlined by the political leadership. The 1971 war is one of the best examples of a war conducted and also a just war in world history conducted by India. This plan evolved over a period of 10 months, and we took 14 days to decisively win the war.
We learned lessons from the Balakot experience to maintain control over the narrative and the escalation. There were many differences between what happened in Balakot and now, particularly in terms of military weaponry and its integration. This was a singular demonstration of the impact of air power, and also a fabulous demonstration of the jointmanship of all three services and the reach of air power. When you possess the right weapons and assemble an air defence system that is like an impenetrable wall, then you have complete control. Also, you are able to penetrate the adversary’s air defence system at will. Everything happened in 23 minutes.
From the 1970s onwards, Pakistan had a good air defence system that was compact, fairly well defended, and robust. They had a Siemens German system in the 1970s, and they have now moved to Saab AW systems. They also acquired Chinese replicas of Russian air defence systems, such as the S300.
Integrated Air Command
In 2005, we started what is known as the Integrated Air Command and Control System for India, and I was part of that development at the time. We decided to pursue it completely indigenously. It has taken off and grown extremely well. It integrates all our radars, missile systems, guns, and legacy systems. It’s all networked and creates a common air defence picture. This is then wired into exceptionally important intelligence inputs, which come from ISR satellite-based inputs, as well as aircraft-based inputs. Then, the human element comes into the picture, with real-time processing of ISR.
Then, of course, we have electronic warfare and deception mechanisms that are part and parcel of electronic warfare issues, SIGINT, and ability to now bring in cyber warfare mechanisms—all of which are integral to this entire warfare. Therefore, when the first day’s narrative was constructed by Pakistan, we didn’t worry about it, because we focused on the objectives. And remember what the DG Air Force clearly stated: in war, many things can happen, but what is more important are the objectives given to the army by the political leadership. Were they achieved? That is precisely what was achieved on May 10th. The Indian military did extremely well to ignore the Pakistani narrative.
Havoc in 23 Minutes
Pakistan knew very well we were going to react and attack as a response to Pahalgam. Therefore, their military was entirely prepared. The Pakistani air defence system was quite well integrated. So, for 14 to 15 days, that complete air defence system would have been active 24/7. We were also ready for their retaliation. Our weapon systems and strike packages were focused on target acquisition and destruction. We increased the pressure points when they still wanted to go further, using drones and missiles. Then we launched the BrahMos, and in 23 minutes, eleven enemy airfields were immobilised. The entire Pakistan Air Force would have been grounded. If we had followed up that attack with a completely new attack, it would have been decimated. That’s the reason they came on their knees for a ceasefire.
We now have a new doctrinal change. The Prime Minister has said that any future terrorist attack will be deemed an act of war. There is a famous formula devised by the CIA in the 1960s by a person named Ray S Cline, to measure national power. That national power has two parts: one is the additive part, which measures population strength, economic power, and military power. And then there is a product power that comes in, which is about strategy and the will to follow the strategy. We’ve always been seen by the West as someone not strong enough to follow through on strategy. I think that story has changed between the seventh and tenth of May 2025.
The future is going to be different. What will be the impact on the rest of the region, on the rest of the world? We are living in a world that is unstable, which is also threatening the 500-year domination of the West. We are pushing for a multipolar world, and these ramifications are going to have a different impact on many other areas. In chaos and complexity theory, particularly in meteorology, as one scientist says, if a butterfly flaps its wings in South America, you will have an El Niño effect somewhere else. That’s the kind of impact you are likely to have from this outcome, and it also depends on how we follow through on this work that we’ve done in these three days.
The Changing Global Context
Dilip Sinha, IFS (Retd)
Former Ambassador & Permanent Representative of India to United Nations
Let me reflect on the diplomatic implications of Operation Sindoor. The Prime Minister has made it unequivocally clear: any future act of terror will be treated as an act of war. There will be no talks if there is terror. We will no longer offer joint investigations or share evidence, as was done in the past—in cases like Pathankot.
After the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met the following year at Sharm El-Sheikh, issuing a joint statement that dialogue was the only way forward. That position has now been firmly discarded. Today, our policy is clear: India will react, and we will choose the time, place, and nature of our response. Pakistan is left uncertain about how we will respond. This unpredictability will truly unsettle Pakistan.
The global context today is vastly different from the past. The international order is in flux, if not already collapsed for all practical purposes. The three major powers are preoccupied with their own conflicts: Russia is embroiled in the Ukraine war; The United States is deeply involved in the Israel-Gaza conflict; China is escalating tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea. In such a scenario, the world is no longer in a position to act in unison against new conflicts. This shift was evident in the global reaction to Operation Sindoor.
After the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, there was universal condemnation. The UN Security Council, despite Pakistan being a non-permanent member and China a permanent one, issued a strong press statement. It unequivocally condemned the attack and called for the perpetrators to be identified and prosecuted. That represents a new normal for India at the global level—we are no longer outvoted or diplomatically cornered in forums like the Security Council. Contrast this with the 1971 Indo-Pak war. On December 4, 1971, just one day after the war began, the Security Council convened and tried to pass a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. The Soviet Union had to veto that resolution.
That old global dynamic no longer exists. When India launched Operation Sindoor, only China and Turkey expressed mild criticism: China stated it regretted the Indian military action while Turkey backed Pakistan’s call for an impartial investigation. Other countries responded in predictable diplomatic language—calling for restraint and de-escalation. These are standard statements in response to any military conflict.
None of Our Business
Overall, India’s global position was relatively secure. While not overwhelming in support, it was far from isolated. Israel expressed clear support. France stated it understood India’s desire to defend itself from terrorism but the UK refrained from offering such support. Most significantly, the United States took a hands-off approach. The Vice President remarked that the situation was “none of their business.” That marks a significant departure from earlier wars, where the U.S. often played an active mediating role. President Trump, in his characteristic style, said even if the war lasted a thousand years, they would ignore it. Even when Pakistan hinted at its nuclear capabilities, there was no sabre-rattling from either side. This in itself was reassuring to the global community and it suggested that the military escalation was controlled.
Pakistan has announced that it will keep the Shimla Agreement in abeyance. Now, the Shimla Agreement, one could argue, has helped maintain peace between our two countries. But at the same time, we must acknowledge that it did not resolve the core issues, especially the one Pakistan refers to as the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
The Shimla Agreement
Under the Shimla Agreement, both sides agreed not to alter the Line of Control (LoC) through force, and that any change could only come through mutual consent. This was effectively an acceptance of the LoC as the de facto border, though not as the international border—leaving the final resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue vague, almost as an afterthought.
Pakistan has seized upon this ambiguity to argue that the issue remains unresolved and warrants dialogue. Although India has always asserted its sovereignty over Pakistan-occupied areas, it has not taken military action since 1972 to reclaim them. Nor have we pursued the matter effectively on international platforms. Unlike Pakistan, which consistently raises the issue at the UN, our references to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have largely been limited to general statements—more policy declarations than actionable intent.
Indus Waters: An Unjust Treaty
Now, coming to the Indus Waters Treaty, this may well become the most lasting consequence of this four-day conflict. While the conflict itself was more a demonstration of capability—a sharp reminder to Pakistan—it was never expected to eliminate terrorism. But the Treaty, which has been in force for over 65 years, is widely seen as extremely unfair and one-sided against India.
Under the treaty, India received the three so-called ‘Eastern Rivers’—the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—that originate in Himachal Pradesh and flow through Punjab before entering Pakistan. Pakistan, in contrast, got the three northern or ‘Western Rivers’—the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—with India permitted only limited use for irrigation and non-consumptive purposes like hydroelectric power.
On paper, it appears to be an equal three-three division. But the reality is that the Eastern Rivers carry only about 20% of the basin’s water, while the Western Rivers, which Pakistan got almost entirely, carry 80%. That imbalance is grossly unfair. If one looks at the distribution of the Indus Basin—spread across India, Pakistan, Tibet, and Afghanistan—Pakistan controls about 47% of the basin. The rest is shared between the other countries. India, therefore, should have received at least 37–38% of the waters. Instead, we ceded far more than was justified.
Time to Revisit the Treaty
Pakistan’s claim was based on the principle of ‘prior use,’ arguing that West Punjab (now in Pakistan) historically drew more water from the canal systems of pre-Partition Punjab. However, ‘prior use’ is only one of several principles under international water-sharing law. Another is the ‘Harmon Doctrine’, propounded by the U.S. Attorney General in a dispute with Mexico, which states that the country through which a river flows has sovereign rights over its waters.
These two principles—prior use (favouring the lower riparian) and sovereignty (favouring the upper riparian)—are fundamentally opposed. There is no binding global consensus on which to follow. The Helsinki Rules by the International Law Association and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses provide guidance but are not universally accepted. India, Pakistan, and China have not ratified this Convention.
Despite this legal grey area, India gave up 80% of the basin’s waters, compromising not only national interest but also the rights of the people of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh—who were completely sidelined. Pakistan, even after securing such a generous deal, objected to every dam or hydroelectric project India proposed on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers. Despite India winning twice under the dispute resolution mechanisms, Pakistan persisted in dragging us to international arbitration. When we proposed revisiting and modernising the treaty—citing new technologies and addressing anomalies—Pakistan outright rejected the idea.
Worse, the treaty lacks a termination clause—another deviation from international treaty norms. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a fundamental change in circumstances can justify the termination of a treaty. Yet the Indus Waters Treaty does not provide any such exit mechanism. This makes it inconsistent with prevailing international law and fundamentally unfair to India. The fact that India has now decided to keep it in abeyance, I hope, is the first step toward eventually abrogating the treaty. If Pakistan seeks continued cooperation, it must come to the table and negotiate a new agreement—one that reflects present realities and is fair to all parties involved.
The Missile Man’s Vision
Dr A Sivathanu Pillai
Former Chief Controller, R&D, DRDO & Founder CEO & MD -BrahMos Aerospace
Today, everyone is talking about BrahMos. But this journey began much earlier—thanks to the vision of Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. Back in 1983, under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), he conceptualized five missile projects: Prithvi, Agni, Akash, Nag, and Trishul. His vision was clear: complete indigenisation.
Why? Because soon after, the global powers, led by the United States, imposed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), effectively denying India any external support. Dr. Kalam responded with resolve: “We don’t need their support. What we build must be world-class and futuristic.” He emphasised not just replicating existing technology but reimagining it. Traditional ballistic missiles follow predictable parabolic trajectories. Ours were designed to be manoeuvrable—difficult to detect, hard to intercept.
At that time, we lacked precision-guided systems due to denied access to cutting-edge technologies. Our young scientists stepped up. They injected software into hardware—an innovation at the time—and achieved a breakthrough: an accuracy of less than 10 meters.
Our Own Super Computer in Two Years
When India was denied a supercomputer, Dr. Kalam personally went to Washington to request one. All he got was lunch. Returning home, he told us, “We are helpless.” But our young scientists disagreed. In just two years, 14 of them built a supercomputer 20 times faster than what we had hoped to import. This led to a revolution in Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), which we used to simulate missile shapes and trajectories. Where simulations previously took nine days, this new system brought it down to under five minutes—before even PARAM came into existence.
Today, we are talking about petaflop systems and quantum computing. But this legacy began there. In terms of technological capability, India is already a developed nation. Yes, we still have pockets of poverty, but our scientific community has proved its mettle time and again. We tested the Agni in 1989. The trial of the upgraded version in 1992 failed. Dr. Kalam formed a review committee with me as convenor. We identified the issue, fixed it, and succeeded.
When Do We Become Number One?
At one point, Dr. Kalam asked: “We are always called the fourth, fifth, or sixth nation in technology. When will we become first?” He then sent me to Harvard in 1991 to broaden our perspective. Coincidentally, the Gulf War was underway. I observed over 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles being used effectively by the U.S. They flew low, evaded radar, and neutralised Saddam’s air defences before launching airstrikes. That was a game-changer.
I returned with two key ideas: India must develop (1) cruise missiles and (2) defensive missile systems. Dr. Kalam agreed. We were already collaborating with Russia on underwater systems. He advised me to explore whether they had any cruise missile technologies they could share. By the end of 1993, Russia showed us a unique supersonic engine—available only with the Soviet Union. At that point, we shifted focus: why just a cruise missile? Why not build the world’s first supersonic cruise missile?
Dr. Kalam constituted another committee under my leadership. After much debate, we concluded that a simple technology transfer would take too long—possibly 15 years. The solution was a joint venture, allowing rapid development and access to advanced technologies. Russia, post-USSR collapse, was in a financial crisis. They agreed to a 50-50 joint venture but couldn’t invest financially. We insisted they contribute, so we proposed an innovative workaround: adjusting payments against India’s earlier defence procurements like the MiG-21s.
After months of negotiation and over several visits to Russia, we sealed the deal. Thus, the BrahMos joint venture was born—one that made India a global pioneer in supersonic cruise missile technology. Eventually, the Russians agreed to a 51:49 joint venture—51% for India and 49% for Russia. But I wasn’t satisfied.
Capturing PM’s Imagination
Dr. Kalam then suggested we meet Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who was also the Defence Minister at that time. This was in 1995. We met him one afternoon. He had just woken from his nap and was in a fresh, receptive state. Dr. Kalam began presenting the concept of the joint venture and the strategic advantages it offered. Rao listened patiently, saying very little. As usual, he was calm and contemplative.
At one point, I interrupted and said, “Sir, this will make India the number one country in the world.” He looked at me sharply—almost disbelievingly. “You’re imagining things,” he said. I explained the rationale behind my claim. After listening, he asked, “So what exactly do you want?”
I replied, “Please allow this to be a private company. Though government-funded, it should operate independently. I cannot work under routine procedures involving finance departments and red tape. We need freedom to execute.” I proposed a 50.5% Indian stake and 49.5% for Russia. To my surprise, he immediately agreed. “It’s a new experiment—go ahead,” he said. The BrahMos project was, at that time, a top-secret mission. He then asked about the timeframe. I said confidently, “We will fly it in three years.”
Carrying A Legacy Forward
Although we had signed the Confidentiality and Security Agreement (CSA) in 1991, by 1995 Rao was no longer in power. He had planned nuclear tests, and we had made preparations during his tenure. Unfortunately, political circumstances didn’t allow it. He hoped to return to office, but lost the election. Before stepping down, he advised Atal Bihari Vajpayee, “You must carry this forward.” Despite political differences, both leaders shared a nationalistic vision.
When Mr. Vajpayee became PM, the nuclear tests happened. That’s another story. But under his leadership, the BrahMos agreement was signed in February 1998, after overcoming numerous challenges. Even before funding was finalised, we had started the design. Our team was stationed in Moscow under the leadership of a propulsion expert. By 1998, our design was ready, but while Indian funding came in quickly, the Russian contribution was delayed. Dr. Kalam had by then moved out of DRDO, but we persisted.
We signed a tripartite agreement clearly laying out responsibilities: DRDO, the Russian side, and BrahMos Aerospace. The agreement was signed by Dr. Kalam (for DRDO), myself (for BrahMos), and the Russian counterpart. George Fernandes was the Defence Minister then. I told him, “I will not go through the usual L1-L2 tender procedures. They delay projects and often select the least capable contractor. I want to have the best vendors in place.” He agreed.
Through this model, we achieved two things. 50% of Development Funding came from Russia. This was effectively free money, yet we retained control over how the systems were used. Two: Industrial Participation via Single Tender Basis: I signed MoUs with industries, stipulating that they invest in production facilities upfront. In return, I guaranteed that they would be the nominated production agencies once orders came in. This enabled us to build infrastructure without government expenditure. Over 20,000 people were mobilised full-time across the country.
Armed With BrahMos
The tests progressed successfully. The Navy asked for a user trial with a live warhead. We mounted the missile on a ship, conducted the trial, and destroyed the target ship with pinpoint accuracy. The Navy immediately inducted BrahMos into its fleet. Today, several of our naval ships are armed with up to 16 BrahMos missiles, capable of firing every three seconds at multiple targets. In recent operations, three ships equipped with BrahMos were deployed. Had the conflict escalated, Karachi wouldn’t have existed. That was our level of preparedness.
We then looked at the Army. Originally, the Indo-Russian agreement restricted BrahMos to naval use. But we demonstrated the missile’s capabilities to Army Chief General J.J. Singh. We conducted two live tests with GPS guidance. However, during one trial on 20 January 2009, on the day President Obama was being inaugurated, the U.S. switched off the GPS. The missile missed the target, and the Army expressed concern. I promised to resolve it within a month. We recalibrated and successfully hit targets in follow-up tests. Satisfied, the Army ordered three full regiments.
Flying With BrahMos
Next, we approached the Air Force. The challenge here was weight—BrahMos weighed three tons, which we reduced to 2.5 tons to make it compatible with the Sukhoi-30MKI. But Russia claimed they didn’t have the airborne launcher system and demanded $250 million to develop one. Our team realised the root issue: India lacked full design access to the Sukhoi. A lesson for all tech transfer negotiations—always secure the complete design.
I took two fully-instrumented aircraft, carried out detailed flight tests, and developed the airborne launch design myself. The Mission Control computer on Sukhoi had embedded Russian software that blocked integration. We decoded and modified the software, angering the Russians. Their President lodged a complaint with our PM, Dr. Manmohan Singh, saying, “This integration must only be done by Russians.” I was told to comply. But I argued this was our opportunity to prove India’s capability. I presented our design, testing, and integration achievements. The government relented.
Later, when President Putin visited, the issue vanished—he had been part of the early decision-making process. He even visited our headquarters and inaugurated our complex. With his support, the air-launch version of BrahMos became reality. We succeeded in building what even the Russians didn’t have.
We overcame enormous obstacles—technical, political, and diplomatic—to reach this point. In the end, BrahMos delivered capabilities that remain unmatched. It offers exceptional precision, with a Circular Error Probability (CEP) approaching zero, making it one of the most accurate missile systems in the world. Its speed places it in a league of its own as the fastest cruise missile currently in service. And with that speed comes immense kinetic energy—its impact force is nearly nine times greater than that of the Tomahawk, giving it a devastating edge in any theatre of operation.
When we showcased BrahMos at an Abu Dhabi exhibition, a Pakistani general visited our stall. After hearing about the features, he asked me, “Will you sell it to Pakistan?”
I replied, “Sir, for you, this is a free-delivery item.”
All of this is documented in my book, The Success Mantra of BrahMos, with a foreword by Dr. Kalam.
Let me leave you with this message: the war is not over. We may have completed one successful operation, but let us not assume our adversaries will remain silent. Challenges will continue to emerge, and we must stay alert and prepared. We are ready—but readiness is not a one-time achievement; it is a continuous state of vigilance and innovation. BrahMos will be deployed in larger numbers. Today, we have five active production centres and over 20,000 dedicated personnel working on the program. And we have taken the next step—India has begun exporting BrahMos to the world. So, the journey continues.
Strategic Reflections on Operation Sindoor and the Emerging India
Lt Gen A Arun (Retd)
PVSM, YSM, SM, VSM
The new India is not just muscular, but no longer shy of its muscles. Whether it’s our cricket team or our country, I’ve always maintained that we have been naturally reticent—hesitant to project our strength. But that India is gone. Today’s India is confident, assertive, and unapologetic about its capabilities. And we should not be ashamed of using our hard power when needed. Soft power has its place—but sometimes, power must be seen to be believed.
The international order has collapsed. I am a vocal proponent of that view. In fact, I question whether the United Nations should even continue in its current form. I say—let India pull out, just once, and see what happens. Out of the 193 members, at least 125 will find themselves adrift. The Security Council and the P5 do what suits them; little else.
Political Gains
What did we gain politically from Operation Sindoor? Tremendous gains, I would say. We signalled clearly to Pakistan what the cost would be for any future misadventure. This cost is not only in men and material but in reputation. The Pakistan military, since the time I was commissioned, prided itself on its air defence systems. That myth lies in tatters today. Their long-held belief in superiority has been shattered.
We also recalibrated the Indus Water Treaty in tone and posture. Earlier, we sought validation from powerful nations for our actions. We must stop. If others offer only polite noises while we bleed, so be it. We are big enough to fight our battles without permission or endorsement.
Psychological Objectives Achieved
More than physical destruction, we struck psychologically, deep into Pakistan’s strategic hinterland. The depth and precision of our strikes have sent a clear and lasting message. We showed resolve—in planning, in execution, and in managing escalation. This was not rash retaliation but a calibrated deterrence.
But I do feel that we missed an opportunity. We should have been more explicit in defining what constitutes a terrorist threat. Now people are splitting hairs: major threat vs minor threat. Any threat is a threat, and must be dealt with accordingly. Even incidents like Sopore, which some dismissed as “minor,” merited retaliation.
Strategic Implications
As someone who once served as Chief of Strategy for the Indian Army, I would be remiss if I didn’t address this. This operation marks a paradigm shift. We have moved from strategic restraint and ambiguity to calibrated deterrence. We now dictate the tempo, shape the escalation, and control the battlefield narrative.
Our strike envelope has expanded—not only in distance and precision, but in the networked synergy among our armed forces. Rather than saying ‘jointness of the forces’, I would call it ‘integration.’ Every operational briefing had representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Ministry of External Affairs. This was a true whole-of-government approach—something we’ve long preached but seldom practiced. And it worked. We discovered much about ourselves: our resilience, our capability, and our resolve.
Let us not allow that learning to dissipate. Let us forge this heat into institutional steel. We showed that we don’t need anyone’s permission. Many countries didn’t stand by us and it didn’t matter. We did what we had to do. And we did it well.
The objective was limited: destroy terror infrastructure. That was accomplished. The message is clear and they are marked.
Tactical Aftermath and New Threats
Going forward, Pakistan will recalibrate its own tactics. Our red lines are now visible. Their response may be to lower the threshold and resort to more frequent, smaller-scale attacks. That presents a unique challenge. It’s easy to locate an airfield; far harder to detect a lone militant with a suicide vest. But I trust our security forces are already preparing for this scenario.
Some of the systems used by Pakistan were of Chinese origin, others American. Much of this equipment was countered—but not all. We must ask ourselves: how effective was our air defence, truly? And how would it perform against a more sophisticated adversary like China? Make no mistake. China is a different cup of tea. But this conflict has allowed us to test ourselves, calibrate, and plan.
The war of the future will be different. Just as we are analysing this conflict, so are multiple nations. Our use of network-centric warfare, integration of services, and precision weaponry—it all has been observed. Our muscular assertiveness will not go unnoticed. We are no longer just a yoga and Ayurveda nation. Finally, let me be blunt—Pakistan is not even a worthy adversary anymore. There are areas of improvement, and we must address them quietly, behind closed doors. That’s how we move from 85–90% effectiveness to 100% accuracy and zero Circular Error Probability (CEP). The endgame must be clear in our minds before we move the first pawn. That clarity of vision will shape our future doctrine and strategic posture.
